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Options and Cross-Border Requirements
Map of Kosovo
Kosovo Final Status
Options and Cross-Border Requirements
brieflyBriefly...
Map of Kosovo
* Kosovo's final status, left undecided at the end of the
Yugoslavia-NATO war in June 1999, will need to be discussed sooner than the
international community anticipates; a roadmap will need to be drawn and the
issue decided within the next three to five years.
* This discussion should begin with an examination of a wide range of
options, including those described and evaluated in Part II of this report.
* Two options can be ruled out as unrealistic: immediate independence,
and return of Kosovo to Belgrade's rule.
* A third option should be ruled out as inimical to international
peace and security: a regional rearrangement of borders in an attempt to
accommodate ethnic differences.
* There remain a range of outcomes and procedures, none of which
stands out as obviously preferable to others.
* Negotiations over final status should include direct discussions
between governing authorities in Belgrade and Pristina with international
facilitation.
* U.S. leadership is essential if negotiations are to succeed.
* Improved security and economic development are required in the
interim, as provided for in UNMIK's benchmarks.
* Whatever the decision, cross-border arrangements will be required to
ensure Kosovo's interests as well as those of its neighbors and other
international partners.
introPART I: INTRODUCTION
Officials in Europe and the United States are today agreed on putting off
the question of Kosovo final status indefinitely. It is generally asserted
that there is no solution in sight, that nothing can be gained from
discussing it, and that there is a great deal else that needs to be done in
the meanwhile to advance reform in Serbia and autonomous governance in
Kosovo. Premature discussions of the issue, it is believed, can only cause
frictions and exacerbate still-sensitive wounds stemming from Milosevic's
crackdowns in Kosovo and the NATO-Yugoslavia war. The parties most directly
involved, both in
Belgrade and Pristina, are also not pressing the issue urgently, the former
because it is hard to picture much to be gained and the latter because the
Kosovo Albanians have largely accepted the notion that it is a good idea to
use the interim period to build a viable governing structure, which they
believe will lead eventually to independence.
Underlying the reluctance to deal with Kosovo final status in the
international community is a conviction that the task is too difficult, the
international community too divided, and the situation not ripe. Sympathy
for Kosovo independence is significantly higher in Washington outside the
U.S. government than in most European capitals, a number of which have
domestic political reasons for not wanting to approve any moves towards
independence by an ethnically distinct province. Many Europeans and some
Americans would like to avoid further disintegration of Yugoslavia now that
Milosevic is gone. The absence of major violence has given the international
community a breathing space, allowing it to return to ignoring Kosovo's
status, as it has in the past.
Final Status Cannot Be Put Off for Long
Neither Serbs nor Albanians are likely to stick for long to their reluctance
to engage on the issue of final status. In Belgrade, many have already come
to believe that Serbia would be relieved of a burden if it could get rid of
Kosovo, or at least the part that is majority Albanian. The issue will be
forced higher on the agenda because Yugoslavia wants to apply for European
Union membership by 2004. The European Union will need to know whether
Yugoslavia will enter with or without Kosovo. While a comparable issue was
fudged with respect to Cyprus when it applied, it is unlikely that the
European Union will make that mistake again. If Yugoslavia's application
entails free movement within the European Union, that will make an enormous
difference to how and when the application is taken up. Western Europe will
not welcome free circulation of more than 1.5 million Albanians. In Kosovo,
the more successful the building of democratic institutions of
self-governance, the more quickly the issue of status will arise among the
Albanians.
Already in Pristina, final status lies just beneath the surface and emerges
through surrogates. The Kosovo Assembly's recent vote against the
Yugoslav-Macedonian border demarcation agreement is best understood as an
indicator of pro-independence sentiment among the Albanians. Discouraged by
the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) from addressing the status
issue directly, the assembly found another way to signal Albanian
determination to achieve independence. The Kosovo prime minister has warned,
with good reason, that ignoring the status issue will strengthen extremists
willing to resort to violence. Conversely, if Albanian politicians are
expected to cooperate in combating extremists who advocate immediate
independence and in jailing "spoilers," they will have to be able to argue
that doing so will accelerate progess toward a decision on final status.
Status issues are already constraining the privatization process and
hindering economic development. How will Kosovo be able to deal with borders
and border controls, citizenship, drug and other trafficking, regional
cooperation on organized crime, and a host of other issues without status
being resolved? The lack of clarity about Kosovo's status poisons relations
between Serbs and Albanians and complicates international and local efforts
at political and economic reform.
This report was prepared in the conviction that not much time is left before
officials will have to begin confronting final status issues in one form or
another. We thought it best to use the time available to clarify the options
and the procedures by which a decision could be made. We hope the report
will help to encourage rational discussion and dialogue on final status
issues within the region, between the United States and the European Union,
and among UN Security Council members, especially Russia and China.
It should be noted, with regret, that this report treats the issue of final
status without considering ethnic groups other than Serbs and Albanians.
This over-simplification does not affect the main lines of the analysis, but
it should be clear that no outcome that fails to protect the rights of all
minorities is a good one.
Belgrade and Pristina Will Have to Agree
Russia and China are important because of their veto power in the UN
Security Council. Kosovo today is an international protectorate under
Security Council Resolution 1244. Any legal change in Kosovo's status will
entail a new Security Council resolution. Russia and China each have their
own reasons for not wanting to see Kosovo gain independence-namely the
precedent that could be set for Chechnya or Tibet. Serbia's concurrence to a
new status for Kosovo will convince the Russians and Chinese to allow a new
resolution to pass.
This leads quickly to the conclusion that Belgrade and Pristina will have to
come to an agreement on Kosovo's final status. If they do, and Belgrade
requests Russian and Chinese support, a new Security Council resolution can
pass. A negotiated solution seems necessary in any event, since the
stability of the outcome will depend on both Belgrade and Pristina agreeing.
Kosovo will not be able to defend itself from a hostile Serbia, and Serbia
will not be able to achieve a role in Kosovo that the vast majority of the
population opposes. Stability after withdrawal of the international
protectorate therefore requires that Belgrade and Pristina come to a
mutually acceptable accommodation.
Belgrade and Pristina cannot come to such an accommodation on their own. It
is crucial for a stable outcome that the interests of regional
parties-Kosovo's nearest neighbors (Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia) as well
as Bosnia-Herzegovina-be taken into account. The United Nations, European
Union, and NATO must also be involved: they already play important roles in
Kosovo, and all Balkan countries see the European Union and Partnership for
Peace as their desired destination. Nor can the United States walk away from
the Kosovo final status issue. Its recent interventions in the region and
its political and diplomatic weight with both Belgrade and Pristina make it
an essential, central player. A stable outcome-one that would allow
withdrawal of U.S. troops-requires that the United States be prepared to
take the lead in finding a solution.
Narrowing the Range of Options
Much of the discussion of Kosovo final status in the Balkans revolves around
two options that in fact need not be on the table because they are
unrealistic. On the one hand, Kosovo will not be able to gain immediate
independence, as many Albanians might like. Even in the United States, where
sympathy for the aspirations of the Albanians is strong outside the
administration, it is recognized that immediate independence is not in the
cards. On the other hand, the notion of returning Kosovo to governance by
even a democratic regime in Belgrade is equally unrealistic, much as some in
Serbia and in Europe would like it. As a first step toward a reasonable
discussion of viable options, the United States and the European Union would
do well to narrow the range of options by explicitly ruling out these two
extremes and thereby encourage Belgrade and Pristina to focus on a more
realistic range of options.
This range is still quite broad. On one extreme, there is independence
guaranteed after a fixed time period, or at some unspecified time in the
future if Kosovo meets specific standards of governance. On the other
extreme, there is continuation of the existing protectorate, or perhaps
handing it off to the European Union, thus denying Kosovo any prospect of
achieving independence in the foreseeable future. In between, there are
options that would allow for continuation of some sort of association
between a more or less independent Kosovo and Serbia, or that allow for a
softer or harder partition of Kosovo and southern Serbia, as well as options
that preserve nominal Yugoslav or
Serbian sovereignty. It is also possible to consider procedural options
whose outcome is not defined. This is what the Dayton peace conference did
with the intractable issue of Brcko, a town in northeastern Bosnia whose
status was decided by arbitration.
These options need to be defined with precision and examined in a
dispassionate way. This is what we have tried to do, looking at each with
the following criteria in mind: consequences for regional stability;
legitimacy with the local populations; viability with the major
international parties; implications for democracy, refugee returns, and
human rights; and the need for international military and civil missions. We
have also tried to examine the process for adoption and implementation of
each option, as well as the implications for U.S. policy. None of the
options stands out as a clear winner overall, though several members of the
task force had clear preferences; the analysis is useful in weighing the
alternatives and thinking about the issues involved.
Cross-Border Arrangements Are Crucial
Thinking through the options, it becomes clear that cross-border
arrangements might remove some of their downsides, and that in any event
such arrangements would be needed to make any of the options a stable
outcome. Louis Sell in Part III discusses the cross-border issues that will
necessarily arise: security and status of the Serbs who live in Kosovo or
want to visit; status and protection of Serb property, historic sites, and
monuments; definition and guarantees of Kosovo's borders with its neighbors;
trade and customs regimes; cross-border travel of Albanians; citizenship of
Kosovo's residents and former residents; and Kosovo security and security
cooperation with its neighbors. These are all issues that will arise no
matter what Kosovo's juridical"status, and some of the issues can be
discussed even without a definition of final status. If Belgrade and
Pristina can define mutually acceptable solutions, they will ease the
process of finding an outcome acceptable to both.
The process by which that outcome is reached needs further definition.
Belgrade-anxious to create new facts on the ground and avoid an explicit
discussion of status-seems ready to begin discussion of practical issues,
but Pristina-concerned that interim >olutions may postpone a resolution of
status-does not. Belgrade's influence over the Kosovo Serbs and the
continued presence of paramilitary elements in Mitrovica make the Albanians
hesitant to engage. It will be an important part of UNMIK's responsibilities
to ensure that the Albanians are prepared for discussions with Belgrade. The
UNMIK "benchmarks," which are concrete milestones by which the United
Nations will assess progress toward its ultimate goals, are an important
first step in the right direction. There will also need to be an
international mediator-whether this is the United Nations, the European
Union, the United States, or some combination thereof is still uncertain.
And there will need to be a forum in which regional parties can ensure that
their vital interests are taken into account even if they cannot determine
the outcome. Belgrade will welcome such a forum, hoping that it will rule
out eventual independence, because of the concerns of Macedonia in
particular and the possible implications for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
international mediator or mediators will need to ensure that Macedonia's and
Bosnia's interests are protected, but without giving them a veto over the
outcome.
The time has come to begin, outside official circles, a discussion of final
status issues. We hope with this paper to stimulate that discussion and to
begin a broad-ranging examination of the issues. Then, when the time comes
for a more official discussion, a wealth of analysis will be available and
many issues will have been clarified.
finalPART II: FINAL STATUS OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
An Institute task force (members listed at the end of the report) examined
options for Kosovo's final status and their implications for U.S. policy
after September 11. While no clear preference emerged, the participants
agreed that: (1) neither immediate independence nor renewed exercise of
sovereignty from Belgrade are viable options; (2) cross-border and regional
arrangements will be necessary features of any final status; and (3)
regional rearrangement of borders should be ruled out. Participants
suggested that the international community should undertake some specific,
immediate tasks regardless of the decision on final status, including
encouraging Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and a start at constructing regional
arrangements.
Why Kosovo Still Matters
* Balkans regional stability, including prevention of terrorism and
organized crime
* potential for democratic governance in a largely Muslim context
* U.S. leadership, NATO viability and cohesion, and credibility of the
United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE)
* U.S. military readiness and availability for other missions
* impact on relations with Europe and Russia
* avoiding and alleviating humanitarian disasters
Salient Features of the Strategic Environment
* post-September 11 commitment to the war against global terrorism
* need to hasten the day when troop drawdown will not destabilize the
region
* Europe willing to assume leadership in the Balkans, with U.S.
seeking a supporting role
* self-governance developing, but process incomplete, especially rule
of law
* Albanian independence aspirations and refusal to participate in
Serbian institutions
* Serbian aspirations for sovereignty and EU candidacy in 2004
* continuing potential for violence in Kosovo and on its periphery
* incomplete democratic transitions in both Belgrade and Pristina
* Albanian and Serbian perception that U.S. military presence is
essential for stability
Criteria for Evaluating Final Status Options
* consequences for regional stability
* legitimacy with the local population
* viability with the major interested international parties
* implications for democracy, refugee returns, and human rights
* continuing requirement for international military and civil missions
Options that resolve final status soon reassure investors and improve
economic prospects. Independence options free Yugoslavia/Serbia of a
burdensome obstacle to EU membership. Non-independence options avoid
disintegration of Yugoslavia.
Basic Choices Faced by International Community
* maintain existing borders and protect minorities (Options 1-7)
* move borders to create more ethnic homogeneity (Option 8)
Option 1: Kosovo Remains a Protectorate Indefinitely
UNMIK or the European Union would continue to oversee increasing Kosovo
auton-
omy in the absence of any process to determine final status. No decision
point or process would be specified for deciding on sovereignty,
independence, or UN membership.
Criteria
Regional stability: Problems exist, but the risks so far have proven
manageable so long as Kosovo Force (KFOR) is in place. Requires KFOR
vigilance in southern Serbia and Macedonia.
Legitimacy: Serbs will want UN role; Albanian extremists may resist
violently if final status is delayed indefinitely, UNMIK maintains
authority, or European Union becomes the protector.
Viability: International community prepared to stay, with the possible
exception of the United States, but postponement of final status will
inhibit investment and economic development.
Democratization/Refugees: Current slow progress in the right direction might
be halted if Albanians see indefinite postponement of final status decision.
International missions: International military presence would have to be
open-ended.
Process for Adoption and Implementation
* Current protectorate will continue unless modified.
* Switching to a formal EU protectorate would require a new Security
Council resolution.
* Albanians, viewing the European Union as anti-independence, would
ask for assurances concerning final status, perhaps conditional independence
or by a date certain (Option 6 or 7).
* Serbs, fearing loss of Russian veto, would want continuation of
Security Council authority.
* Shift of protectorate from the United Nations to the European Union
would therefore open up final status issues.
Implications for U.S. Policy
* Continuation of UN protectorate requires U.S. engagement
indefinitely, but possibly lower troop levels if the situation calms
further.
* The United States would have to deliver both Albanian and Serbian
agreement to EU protectorate.
* Difficult negotiations with European Union might lead to continuing
U.S. commitments.
* The United States would have to accept end of EU protectorate on
terms decided by the Europeans.
Option 2: Cantonization/Decentralization
Serb enclaves govern themselves under de facto (not necessarily de jure)
Yugoslav sovereignty, regardless of Kosovo's status; this is a "soft"
partition scenario.
Criteria
Regional stability: Albanians might ask similar autonomy in
Macedonia/southern Serbia.
Legitimacy: Many Kosovo and Belgrade Serbs would accept; Albanians would
resist.
Viability: Might prove acceptable as a compromise in the international
community.
Democratization/Refugees: Encourages Serb returns, though not all to their
original homes. Allows separate democratic institutions, but complicated to
administer.
International missions: Indefinite military requirements around enclaves;
continuing Albanian resistance likely.
Process for Adoption and Implementation
* Kosovo is already evolving in this direction.
* Serb-Albanian negotiations under UNMIK; U.S. pressure on Albanians.
* Peacekeepers would be required to protect Serb areas and guard
Kosovo borders.
Implications for U.S. Policy
* Efforts to consolidate Bosnian and Macedonian states should be
redoubled.
* The United States should not press for reunification of Mitrovica or
UN authority in the north.
* Establishment of multi-ethnic Kosovo administration not important.
* Belgrade efforts to maintain authority in the north should not be
resisted.
* Return of Serb internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to
Albanian-majority areas should no longer be encouraged.
Option 3: Loose Federation
Belgrade retains nominal sovereignty, but Kosovo functions as an independent
state within current borders although without separate UN membership (like
Montenegro).
Criteria
Regional stability: Avoids a formal change of sovereignty and borders.
Legitimacy: Serbs would accept if cantonization/decentralization (Option 2)
is included, but Albanians want UN membership and would resist, perhaps with
violence.
Viability: International community might accept, but practical problems of
property ownership and citizenship would be considerable.
Democratization/Refugees: Some Serb returns, but Albanian resistance would
continue; Albanians will refuse to participate in any Belgrade governing
structure.
International missions: Reduced civilian-military requirements possible.
Process for Adoption and Implementation
* Negotiations between Serbs and Albanians under UNMIK.
* The United States would have to pressure Albanians to accept nominal
Serb sovereignty and give up on UN membership.
* Security Council approval not required.
* Peacekeepers would be required to protect Serb areas and to guard
Kosovo borders.
Implications for U.S. Policy
* The United States should emphasize that independence and sovereignty
can be separate issues.
Option 4: Commonwealth
Belgrade retains nominal sovereignty, but Kosovo functions as an independent
state within current borders and with separate UN membership (like Canada or
Australia).
Criteria
Regional stability: Preservation of a tie between Kosovo and Serbia would
reduce regional concerns.
Legitimacy: Serbs would resist UN membership and equality between Serbia and
Kosovo, and Albanians would resist nominal sovereignty.
Viability: International community would like to see some tie between Kosovo
and Serbia maintained, even a nominal one.
Democratization/Refugees: Serb returns unlikely, unless combined with
cantonization/ decentralization (Option 2).
International missions: Reduced civilian-military requirements possible.
Process for Adoption and Implementation
* Negotiations between Serbs and Albanians under UNMIK, but the United
States would have to pressure Albanians to accept continuing tie to Serbia.
* Security Council approval required.
* Peacekeepers would be required to protect Serb areas and to guard
Kosovo borders.
Implications for U.S. Policy
* The United States would have to convince Russians and Chinese to
allow UN flag for Kosovo.
* The United States should emphasize that independence and sovereignty
can be separate.
Option 5: Decision by an International Panel by a Date Certain
An international panel would determine final status within a fixed period
(for example, three years); there would be no guarantee of eventual
independence. The outcome would be conditional on the performance of Serbs
and Albanians with respect to specific criteria. These could include
democratic self-governance, participation in Kosovo institutions, respect
for human rights, return of refugees and displaced persons, and responsible
regional behavior.
Criteria
Regional stability: Gives Serbs and Albanians stakes in promoting regional
stability.
Legitimacy: Both Serbs and Albanians would object, and one or the other
would likely be unhappy with the decision.
Viability: International community leverage increased; removing decision
from Security Council avoids direct friction with Russia and China.
Democratization/Refugees: Increases incentives for co-existence, refugee
returns, and respect for minority rights, but extremists unlikely to
moderate their behavior.
International missions: Residual international military presence needed at
least until the decision and probably thereafter, but drawdowns might be
possible.
Process for Adoption and Implementation
* The Security Council would have to establish the panel and commit to
accepting its decision.
* Composition of the panel would have to be negotiated with the
European Union and Russia but could include both a Serb and an Albanian
(without giving either a veto).
* The panel would be given direction on the criteria to be considered
and leeway to decide on special arrangements, as was the case for the Brcko
arbitration.
Implications for U.S. Policy
* Rather than focusing on the final status outcome, the United States
would participate in a process that will allow a reasonable decision to be
made.
* If the United States wants more control over the outcome, it could
seek to name the chair of the panel, as it did with the Brcko arbitration.
* Incentive for both Serbs and Albanians to behave well would reduce
burdens on the United States and international community generally.
Option 6: Conditional Independence
With unchanged borders, Kosovo would progress toward independence,
contingent on demonstrated democratic self-governance, respect for minority
rights, and responsible behavior in the region. The guarantee that Kosovo
will not return to Belgrade rule would match a commitment that Kosovo will
not seek to expand its boundaries or de-stabilize neighbors. The
international community would provide security guarantees for minorities and
refugee return. Independence would be the ultimate endpoint, including
Kosovo control of foreign policy, budget, public security, and the judicial
system. The UN special representative would retain veto power over issues
relating to protection of minority rights and external borders during the
transition period. An international force would still be needed indefinitely
for external security. A small, local armed civil defense force would back
up the Kosovo Police Service.
Criteria
Regional stability: Gives Albanians a stake in regional stability but gives
nationalist Serbs an incentive to slow progress and seek similar arrangement
for Republika Srpska.
Legitimacy: Assurance of independence provides legitimacy with some
Albanians, but it is not clear that extremists would accept conditionality.
Viability: International community leverage lessened by ensuring
independence up front.
Democratization/Refugees: Increases incentives for co-existence, refugee
returns, and respect for minority rights through linkage with Albanian
desire for independence.
International missions: Residual international military presence could be
open-ended.
Process for Adoption and Implementation
* The United States, Britain, and the European Union announce that
conditional independence is the preferred option after encouraging the
Kosovo and Belgrade leaderships to accept it as a way to put the issue in
the past.
* The Kosovo Status Council-including the United States, European
Union, Russia, other major donors, and elected officials from Belgrade and
Pristina-is established in 2002 and is responsible for setting and
evaluating progress on conditions.
* The council initially addresses practical issues to be resolved in
any future relationship, then moves to consultations on final status,
preferably in an international meeting.
* Eventual independence would require a Security Council resolution
changing resolution 1244.
Implications for U.S. Policy
* The United States must remain engaged, both to ensure proper
fulfillment of conditions and to back continuing international presence.
* The United States will also have to convince China and Russia to go
along.
* Consultations on this approach should begin with the Europeans as
soon as possible.
* The United States would have to insist on this approach with
Belgrade, which will resist.
* UNMIK efforts to establish authority throughout Kosovo, establish
Kosovo-wide administration, and return IDPs and refugees home should be
redoubled.
* Efforts to consolidate Bosnian and Macedonian states should be
redoubled.
Option 7: Independence Within Existing Borders at a Date Certain
After an agreed period (perhaps three years) of increasing self-rule under
international supervision, Kosovo would become an independent state within
its current borders. Kosovo Serbs would get internationally guaranteed
rights and broad local autonomy. Before independence, Kosovo would establish
cooperative trans-border political, economic, and security relationships
with neighboring states. International monitoring would continue for a
limited period after independence.
Criteria
Regional stability: Some Albanian extremists might continue efforts for
Greater Albania; Serb resistance to Pristina authority in the north and the
push for partition would increase.
Legitimacy: Albanians would fulfill their major goal; Serbs would view this
option as illegitimate, creating conditions for a new conflict, though some
in Belgrade will feel relieved of a burden.
Viability: Many in the international community would resist "unearned"
independence, especially if Albanian treatment of Serbs does not improve
sharply.
Democracy/Refugees: This option would increase Kosovo Serb departures,
especially outside of northern Serb strongholds, although local autonomy or
cantonization/decentralization (Option 2) could induce some Serbs to remain.
International missions: Strong international effort would be required;
regional arrangements could allow eventual reduction of foreign military
presence; civilian monitoring would need to remain longer.
Process for Implementation
* U.S.-European agreement to pursue independence by a date certain and
provide incentives to Belgrade and Kosovo Serbs.
* Negotiations, under international lead, between Belgrade and Kosovo
Albanians, with participation of neighboring states.
* Continued strong international military and civilian presence for a
transition period.
Implications for U.S. Policy
* U.S. leadership required to sell the idea to Russia, China, and some
Europeans.
* Active U.S. engagement in negotiation and implementation.
* Need to counter possible anti-reform backlash in Belgrade and
possible regional spillover to neighboring hotspots, such as Macedonia and
Republika Srpska.
* Successful accord vindicates U.S.-led intervention and allows
reduced U.S. presence.
Option 8: Independence with Partition
Three northern municipalities-Zvecan, Zubin Potok, and Leposavic-as well as
Mitrovica north of the Ibar River would go to Serbia. The other 26.5
municipalities would constitute an independent Kosovo state.
Albanian-dominated areas of southern Serbia would become part of Kosovo.
Willing Serbs and other minorities would be assisted in moving. Kosovo Serbs
who stay (and others who want it) would be granted dual citizenship. The
KFOR mission would support this movement, then redeploy along new Kosovo
borders. Key Trepca mining components would go to Serbia, but parts would
remain under Albanian control. UNMIK would become a smaller advisory
mission.
Criteria
Regional stability: Destabilizing precedent for Bosnia, Macedonia, and
Serbia. Albanians would still want Trepca. Serbs would want Serb sites south
of the Ibar and Presevo.
Legitimacy: Partition would be compensation for Serbia to accept Kosovo's
independence; independence would be necessary for Albanians to accept
partition. Future of 50,000 Serbs in southern Kosovo jeopardized.
Viability: International community would resist opening "Pandora's box" of
partition, which it avoided in the past; support for resettlement uncertain.
Democratization/Refugees: About 200,000 Serbs and others would lose their
homes. Serbia and Kosovo could proceed with democratization but on a more
mono-ethnic basis.
International missions: Short-term increase in demands on KFOR and UNMIK to
manage ethnic separation; if successful, accelerated reduction in
international role possible.
Process for Adoption and Implementation
* Once interim administration is functioning, the Security Council
would signal willingness to accept partition provided it does not affect
territorial integrity of Macedonia and Bosnia.
* Albanians and Serbs would meet with international mediators to
decide precise terms.
* Arrangements for Trepca and Serb sites in the south would be
negotiated.
* The Security Council and a conference with neighboring states would
ratify final settlement.
Implications for U.S. Policy
* Efforts to consolidate Bosnian and Macedonian states should be
redoubled.
* The United States should not press for reunification of Mitrovica or
UN authority in the north.
* Implementation of southern Serbia agreement not a priority.
* Establishment of multi-ethnic Kosovo administration not a priority.
* Belgrade efforts to maintain authority in the north should not be
resisted.
* Return of IDPs and refugees to their homes in Albanian areas should
not be encouraged.
Required International Actions Regardless of Final Status
It will take some time to sort through the options outlined above and come
to an international consensus on what is best. Any decision on final status
is some time in the future, though likely not more than five years. In the
meanwhile, the international community needs to undertake the following
actions.
Dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade
* Start with immediate issues (cooperation on missing persons,
returns, property).
* Develop mechanism for conflict management and advancing common
interests (for example, exploitation of Trepca complex).
* Then address problems created by uncertain final status
(extradition, mutual legal assistance, visas, privatization).
* Build momentum and confidence in the process before tackling final
status.
Security
* Safeguard Serbs and other minorities.
* Provide sanctions for failure to act against perpetrators of
inter-ethnic violence, and reward protection of minority rights.
* Prepare for follow-on force for KFOR by determining requirements
(counter-terror, criminal investigation, surveillance, high-risk arrest,
close protection, rapid reaction).
* Develop EU capability (for example, Italian Carabinieri, Spanish
Guardia Civil, French Gendarmes) to meet these requirements.
* Create constructive missions for KPC or its successor, including
international disaster relief, and build capacity of Kosovar government for
democratic oversight.
* Improve recruiting of Serb and international judges, prosecutors,
and police/penal supervisors.
* Use international judges to try war criminals, spoilers, and others
responsible for inter-ethnic violence.
Economic Development
* Commercialize/privatize former socially owned enterprises.
* Develop reliable power generation and payment collection capability.
* Ensure Kosovo government can generate revenue, collect taxes, and
control borders.
Political
* Focus assistance to elected leaders on building capacity for
democratic self-governance and coping with inter-ethnic violence and
organized crime.
* Assist non-elected elites as well, especially journalists, women,
academics, human rights and democratization NGOs, and others in civil
society.
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crossPART III: CROSS-BORDER REGIONAL ISSUES
None of the options listed above can be successful without attention to the
regional context, and cross-border arrangements could well be decisive in
determining success or failure.
This part of the report looks at some of the underlying issues, including
trade, travel, and other forms of human contact; Kosovo's external security
and the security of its neighbors; and the Serb community and monuments in
Kosovo. It highlights cross-border regional issues that will have to be
addressed together with final status, and it concludes with a specific
proposal for a comprehensive regional accord.
Open Borders
An important element of Kosovo's future status will be rules governing
trade, travel, communications, and all other forms of human contact among
the countries of the region. The mutual understanding, reconciliation, and
prosperity that must be the foundation of any lasting settlement will
require the maximum possible openness in the flows of people, goods, and
information.
There is already a considerable amount of trade between Kosovo and its
neighbors, including Serbia. Some is open and above board. Much, however, is
either openly criminal or involves the avoidance of customs or taxes. The
challenge will be to draw trade and other forms of contact into open, legal,
and taxable channels while fostering cooperation among the authorities of
the region in combating illegal flows of goods, money, and people.
Persisting distrust, the legacy of war, and continued economic backwardness
will make these issues difficult for all parties. Serbs, for example, will
seek the maximum freedom of movement between Serbia and Serb settlements and
monuments in Kosovo but they may be leery of allowing large numbers of
Albanians to enter Serbia. Kosovo will be torn between pressures to
encourage economic cooperation with its neighbors and pressures to protect
its fledgling industries, still recovering from the effects of Serb
occupation, war, and delayed implementation of reforms.
Regardless of the final status option chosen, Kosovo and its neighbors will
have to work out rules governing a wide range of matters affecting
cross-border trade and economic cooperation:
* tariffs and other matters affecting trade and commerce
* currency rules
* transportation, communication, and tax rules
Human contacts between the people of Kosovo and their neighbors will also
have to be addressed. Ideally, resolution of Kosovo's final status should be
accompanied by agreements making the region as open as possible to the free
flow of people, information, and travel. The agreements should include:
* maximum freedom of movement between Kosovo and its neighbors
* rules governing the mutual recognition of passports, visas, and
internal documents
* measures to encourage the flow of information, especially in the
media
Kosovo and its neighbors need an institutional framework that will allow
economic cooperation and the free and transparent flow of goods, capital,
and labor across regional boundaries. A necessary precondition is internal
economic and legal reform in all of the countries of the region. Equally
important will be establishing a common approach toward relations with the
European Union.
All countries of the region say that "joining Europe" is one of their
highest priorities, although it may not be clear what is really involved.
Kosovo already has something of a special relationship with the European
Union by virtue of using the Euro as its legal currency. Serbia has stated
its intention to apply for EU membership in 2004. Nevertheless, membership
in the European Union or even full associate status for Kosovo, Serbia, and
other neighboring countries seems highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.
At present each country in the region looks directly to Brussels to work out
its own relationship with the European Union. This is unlikely to change.
The Kosovo Albanians are particularly allergic to anything that seems to
imply that their path toward Europe lies through Belgrade. Nevertheless,
Kosovo should be given to understand that its future relationships with the
European Union depend not just on its own political and economic reform but
also on cooperation with its neighbors. It is important tha> regional
cooperation not be seen as an alternative to Europe, as condemning the
countries of the region to a second-class ghetto. Rather, the international
community should encourage the notion of regional cooperation as a way for
all countries of the region to move together toward Europe.
Security for Kosovo and Its Neighbors
Any discussion of Kosovo's future security needs to take account of several
realities:
* Kosovo is too small to provide for its own security in its tough
neigborhood.
* Kosovo Albanians will not want Belgrade to play an active role in
Kosovo's security.
* Kosovo can never be truly secure unless its status is accepted by
Belgrade.
* Security for Kosovo can only be assured on a regional basis.
* There can be no lasting security for the region until Kosovo is
stable and secure and presents no security threat to its neighbors, in
particular Macedonia but also Serbia.
Provided that Kosovo is not returned to rule by Belgrade and does not remain
indefinitely as an international protectorate, any final status deal will
need to provide for Kosovo's external security, and that will require some
form of international commitment. This commitment could include a range of
options, from a continued-but smaller-international military presence, an
over-the-horizon international military force having as one of its missions
protection of Kosovo's security, to an international security guarantee for
Kosovo that did not have a dedicated military component.
Kosovo Albanians understand that they alone cannot provide for Kosovo's
security. They believe that NATO-and especially the United States-should
play a permanent role in Kosovo's security, which they view primarily in
terms of the threat from Belgrade and, to a lesser extent, the threat from
potential instability in neighboring areas. Kosovo Albanians look at the
impressive U.S. military facility at Camp Bondsteel and persuade themselves
that the United States intends to retain a military presence there
indefinitely. As Kosovo Albanians gain increasing control over their own
self-governance, they would be willing to offer the United States-and other
NATO members-virtually anything they wish in terms of permanent basing
rights in order to assure continued NATO presence.
At the same time, as Kosovo assumes growing authority over its own affairs,
Kosovo Albanians will want a role in their own security, including through
the creation of a small Kosovo armed force responsible at least for border
security. Kosovo Albanians see the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) as the
nucleus of a future Kosovo military, but if international skepticism about
the KPC proves too strong Albanians would be willing to see an entirely new
force created. In either case, given recent history, a Kosovo military force
is likely to be dominated by former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) fighters.
Some Kosovo Albanians have been thinking about the future shape of a Kosovo
military, which they see as a small, professional force modeled on NATO
lines. Kosovo Albanians will seek the closest possible ties between their
own military and NATO. To the extent that the European Union develops its
own military capabilities, Kosovo Albanians will also seek some military
links with it but their preference will be to concentrate on NATO because of
the U.S. lead role there and because of Albanian skepticism about France and
other nations pushing the EU military wagon.
Serbs, on the other hand, are strongly opposed to any separate Kosovo
military force. Belgrade opposes anything that goes beyond the "substantial
autonomy" allowed in UN Security Council resolution 1244. But Belgrade
understands that Kosovo could not provide any serious military threat to
Serbia. In the context of an otherwise acceptable political deal, Belgrade
could probably be brought to accept a modest Kosovo military force, provided
it was tightly associated with NATO.
Kosovo Serbs, on the other hand, have real reasons to fear any Kosovo
military, which would inevitably be dominated by Albanians and probably be
led by men associated with the KLA. It is hard to imagine any substantial
numbers of Serbs remaining in a Kosovo that had its own military unless a
substantial and active foreign military force also remained in Kosovo. It
would also be necessary to establish special provisions for any Kosovo
military force regarding its access to Serb areas and the role of Kosovo
Serbs in it. These provisions would only be taken seriously by both sides if
they were monitored and enforced by a robust foreign military presence.
Kosovo could also present a security threat to its neighbors, as it did in
1999-2001, first by exporting guerrillas to southern Serbia and later by
exporting them to Macedonia.
In sum, negotiations about Kosovo's future status must consider the
following issues:
* the size, mandate, duration, and sponsorship of foreign military
presence in Kosovo
* the type of military force the new Kosovo will be allowed and the
rules governing its relationship to the Kosovo Serb community
* the relationship any Kosovo military security forces would have with
NATO and other international bodies, including the European Union
* guarantees for the security of Kosovo's neighbors, in particular
Macedonia and Serbia
Serbs and Serb Monuments in Kosovo
The position of Serbs in Kosovo will be a major issue in the negotiations
over Kosovo's future status. All options will feature full guarantees for
Serb political, economic, cultural, and other rights. Nevertheless, a coldly
realistic view of the future would judge it unlikely that significant
numbers of Serbs will remain in Kosovo under any option that would put them
under rule by Albanians. Most Serbs say they would flee Kosovo under any
such option and there is no reason not to take them at their word; just as
there is no reason not to take Albanians at their word that they would fight
or flee any option that returned them to Belgrade's rule. The Serb community
in Kosovo, moreover, has been declining for centuries and this process of
ethnic homogenization (paralleled by the decline in the numbers of Albanians
living compactly in Serbia proper) is unlikely to be reversed in the future,
if only because few Serbs see much economic prospect for them in Kosovo.
Options such as partition or cantonization/decentralization (Option 2) would
explicitly remove Serbs in the separated or cantonized areas from the de
facto jurisdiction of Pristina. Most Serbs living outside these areas would
probably flee, either voluntarily or under pressure by resentful Albanians,
as would any Albanians remaining in the Serb areas.
Nevertheless, a few Serbs are likely to remain in Kosovo under any final
status outcome. Any agreement, therefore, even one based on ethnic
separation, must include full guarantees for the security and rights of
Serbs that remain. It will also be important to include provisions
guaranteeing Serbs in Kosovo special rights of contact with Serbia, such as
visa-free travel, mutual recognition of travel documents, and access to Serb
media and cultural matters. A mechanism to resolve residential property
claims will also be an important part of any settlement, especially the
ethnic separation options. A way to document and provide prompt compensation
for residential property transfers would be an important element in allowing
people in both ethnic groups to put the past behind them and get on with
their lives. Resolving business property claims is also extremely important
but this is best handled under economic aspects of an overall agreement.
No matter how many Serbs stay in Kosovo, Serb religious and historical
monuments will remain. A certain number of Orthodox religious figures will
also remain, at least at the key shrines of Pec, Decani, and Gracanica. The
fate of the Serb sites is a legitimate object of interest to Belgrade and-in
view of their artistic and historical importance-to the entire world. Any
option on Kosovo's future political status must ensure that these sites are
protected, that the religious figures and other individuals associated with
them can live ^nd work in safety, and that Serbs and other non-Albanians can
visit them freely and safely.
The most reliable way to protect Serb sites-perhaps the only reliable way
over the long term-is for the Kosovo Albanian people and government to
accept the responsibility of doing so. Given time-and a solution to Kosovo's
final status that Kosovo Albanians regard as equitable-this is not an
unobtainable goal. For the foreseeable future, however, it is unlikely that
Serbs or internationals would feel comfortable entrusting security over Serb
shrines to Kosovo Albanians.
There are, then, two options (not necessarily exclusive) for providing
security to Serb sites in Kosovo: continued international engagement, and a
limited Serb security presence. Although there have recently been some
modestly hopeful signs that the security climate for Serbs in Kosovo could
be improving, for now some kind of international security presence will be
necessary to safeguard Serb sites. Over time, and provided Kosovo appears to
be moving toward a resolution of the final status issue that would be
broadly acceptable to most Albanians, it should be possible to reduce the
size of KFOR contingents guarding Serb sites, to protect more sites through
mobile patrols, and to give increasing responsibility to non-military units,
such as police and neighborhood watch groups.
It is also possible that some form of Serb security presence-something
between symbolic and modest-could be introduced to provide greater security
confidence for Serb sites in Kosovo. As with all other aspects of Kosovo's
future status there is a balance here. The more secure Albanians themselves
feel about Belgrade and the more comfortable they are with the final
political settlement, the more willing Albanians will be to grant legitimate
Serb security requests in Kosovo.
It is possible, therefore, that in the context of an otherwise acceptable
political settlement, Albanians would accept some kind of limited
extraterritorial rights for a few of the most important Serb shrines-the
monasteries of Pec, Decani, and Gracanica and the Kosovo Polje battlefield
site, for example. It is also possible that a small, non-military Serb
security presence would be accepted at these sites, provided its size and
mission were strictly limited and it was not seen as the thin end of a wedge
to introduce more Serb forces into Kosovo. This would be more acceptable to
Albanians if the settlement included some form of international security
guarantees and, still better, an international security presence in Kosovo.
A Comprehensive Regional Approach
As negotiations over Kosovo's future status begin, it will become
increasingly evident that all the issues affecting the future of Kosovo and
its neighbors can best be addressed in a comprehensive regional framework.
Kosovo and its neighbors can only be truly secure in the context of a secure
region, and resolution of Kosovo's future status will inevitably touch on
other issues affecting regional security, including downsizing and bringing
under civilian control the Serb military, determining the degree of
integration of Presevo into Serbian political life, and preserving Macedonia
as a single state.
Regional cooperation would reflect common elements that international
involvement has brought to the region. These include efforts to introduce
political values associated with a civil society; the encouragement of
civil, criminal, and commercial codes based on these values across the
region; encouragement of economic reform and a market economy; and common
training in a variety of important fields such as police. The desire of all
entities in the region for a closer relationship with the European Union
will also be a powerful factor favoring regional cooperation, in view of the
need to adopt EU rules, standards, and principles.
Regional cooperation can also help smooth out political problems beyond
Kosovo. Serbs in Bosnia or Albanians in Macedonia, for example, might be
less insistent on using the creation of an independent Kosovo as an excuse
for separation from their respective states if Kosovo were embedded in a
broad framework of regional cooperation.
Specific elements of a comprehensive regional approach would include the
following:
* A single economic zone among participating states, in which people,
goods, labor, capital, and information moved freely across borders. It would
include agreements on phasing out tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade;
harmonization of currency, customs, tax, labor, and transportation regimes;
a single approach toward economic reform and privatization; and
implementation of EU standards for investment, intellectual property, and
dispute settlement.
* Political agreements guaranteeing inviolability of borders, minority
rights, protection and access to religious and cultural monuments; contacts
between minority groups and "home" states; and free flow of cultural
information and contacts.
* A security pact using the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe (CFE) and the Vienna Document (Negotiations on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures) as models that would provide for limits on
troops and certain categories of weapons, pledges of the non-use of force,
and confidence-building measures.
A regional approach would have concentric circles of possible members. At
its narrowest it could include Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo, each as an
independent state but closely linked through regional ties. The regional
approach could also usefully include the former Yugoslav states of Bosnia
and Macedonia. (It is virtually certain that the other former Yugoslav
states, Slovenia and Croatia, would not wish to join.) Albania could also be
included but this might raise objections from Serbia, Montenegro, and
Macedonia.
Participants in the Task Force
Kurt Bassuener, Co-Director, Democratization Policy Institute
Michael Dzeidzic, Program Officer, Balkans Initiative, U.S. Institute of
Peace
Jusuf Fuduli, Research Assistant, Balkans Initiative, U.S. Institute of
Peace
Heather Hurlburt, Deputy Director, International Crisis Group, Washington
Office
James Hooper, Public International Law and Policy Group
Julie Mertus, American University
Brenda Pearson, Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace
Robert Perito, Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace
Colette Rausch, Program Officer, Rule of Law Program, U.S. Institute of
Peace
Louis Sell, University of Maine
Gen. John O. B. Sewall (ret.)
Daniel Serwer, Director, Balkans Initiative, U.S. Institute of Peace
Paul Szasz, New York University (participated in task force meetings but
died before final report was prepared)
Eric Witte, Coalition for International Justice
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relatedOf Related Interest
Many other publications from the United States Institute of Peace address
issues that relate directly to Kosovo, the Balkans, and European security.
Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Lessons from the Past, Ideas for the Future
(Special Report 87, May
2002)
Enhancing International Civilian Police in Peace Operations
(Special Report 85,
April 2002)
Serbia Still at the Crossroads
(Special Report 84,
March 2002)
Taking Stock and Moving Forward: Intervention in the Balkans and Beyond
(Special Report 83,
February 2002)
Albanians in the Balkans
(Special Report 77, November 2001)
Whither the Bulldozer? Nonviolent Revolution and the Transition to Democracy
in Serbia (Special
Report, August 2001)
American Civilian Police in Peace Operations
(Special Report, July
2001)
Serbia and Montenegro: Reintegration, Divorce, or Something Else? by Stojan
Cerovic (Special
Report, April 2001)
The Future of Macedonia: A Balkan Survivor Now Needs Reform
(Special Report, March
2001)
Europe in the 21st Century: A Strategy for Achieving Stable Peace
(Special Report,
November 2000)
Bosnia's Next Five Years: Dayton and Beyond
(Special Report,
November 2000)
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libraryInstitute Library Resources
Regional Resources: Kosovo
http://www.usip.org/library/regions/kosovo.html
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aboutAbout the Report
This report stems from an informal task force convened over several months
under the chairmanship of Daniel Serwer, director of the Balkans Initiative
at the United States Institute of Peace, to consider the full range of
options for Kosovo's final status. Serwer prepared the introduction, Part I.
The report of the task force itself is Part II. There emerged from the task
force's work a consensus that cross-border issues, whatever the status of
Kosovo, would be important and need better definition. University of Maine
professor Louis Sell, who catalyzed the consensus, prepared Part III of this
report.
The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the
United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policies.
Taken from: http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr91.html
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